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R ecent studies have identified a near-linear relationship between global mean temperature change and cumulative CO 2 emissions [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] . This relationship leads to an intuitive and appealing application in climate policy. A global quota on cumulative CO 2 emissions from all sources (fossil fuel combustion, industrial processes and land-use change) can be directly linked to a nominated temperature threshold with a specified probability of success. It can be used regardless of where, or to a large degree when, the emissions occur 10 . Despite the many reservoirs and timescales that affect the response of the climate and carbon cycle 11 , the proportionality between temperature and cumulative CO 2 emissions is remarkably robust across models. The relationship has been called the transient climate response to cumulative carbon emissions (TCRE) and was highlighted in the fifth assessment report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 12 . The nearlinear relationship has strong theoretical support: radiative forcing per emitted tonne of CO 2 decreases with higher CO 2 concentrations, an effect that is compensated by the weakening of the ocean and biosphere carbon sinks leading to a larger fraction of emitted CO 2 remaining in the atmosphere [13] [14] [15] . The uncertainty in the TCRE, accounted for here in the given probability 12, 16 , thus comes from the climate response to CO 2 and the carbon cycle feedbacks 14, [17] [18] [19] . The near-linear relationship holds for cumulative CO 2 emissions less than about 7,500 GtCO 2 and until temperatures peak 16 . Although CO 2 is the dominant anthropogenic forcing of the climate system 20 , non-CO 2 greenhouse gases and aerosols also contribute to climate change. However, unlike for CO 2 , the forcing . Therefore it is necessary to account for the additional warming from non-CO 2 agents separately when estimating CO 2 emission quotas compatible with a given temperature limit. The forcing from non-CO 2 agents has a considerable range across emissions scenarios in the recent IPCC Working Group III (WGIII) database 24 , reflecting expected development pathways, coherently for CO 2 and other forcing agents given the underlying climate and other policies 25 . Generally, forcing from non-CO 2 agents contributes 10-30% of the total forcing 9 ( Supplementary Fig. 1 ).
For a 66% probability of staying below a temperature threshold of 2 °C, CO 2 emissions would need to be kept below 3,670 GtCO 2 if accounting for forcing from CO 2 only (4,440 GtCO 2 for a 50% probability) 12, 26 . When accounting for both CO 2 and non-CO 2 forcing as represented in the multiple scenarios available in the IPCC WGIII database, the quota associated with a 66% probability of keeping warming below 2 °C reduces to 3,200 (2,900-3,600) GtCO 2 (3,500 (3,100-3,900) GtCO 2 for a 50% probability) ( Table 1 and  Supplementary Table 1 ). The estimate of cumulative budget can vary slightly (by about 15%) with the set of scenarios used, due to variations in the relative contribution of non-CO 2 radiative forcing (Supplementary Information).
In recent years, interest has grown in using cumulative emissions more directly in climate policy 9, [27] [28] [29] [30] . In the following we update regional and global emission estimates up to 2014 and provide projections up to 2019. The emission estimates and trends are used to update the emission quota remaining from 2020, the potential year emissions in emerging economies, partly due to the intensification of world trade 43, 44 , and partially offsetting emissions in some large developed countries 44 . These patterns have led to a significant regional redistribution in emissions in all key dimensions: absolute, per-capita, and cumulative (Table 2 , Fig. 2a ). The top four emitters play a critical role in emissions growth, China accounted for 57% of the growth in global emissions from 2012-2013, USA for 20%, India for 17%, while EU28 had a negative contribution of -11%.
The developed countries defined in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol had a 0.4% increase in emissions in 2013, reversing the trend of decreased emissions since 2007. The USA's 2.9% growth in emissions in 2013 reversed the nation's trend of decreasing for the onset of a new global climate agreement. We explore various uncertainties with cumulative emissions and the consequences for the remaining quota. We compare the emission trends and remaining emission quota with the emissions scenarios used in the recently published IPCC AR5 WGIII report that are consistent with keeping the global temperature increase below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels. This analysis thus brings together currently disjointed perspectives: (1) the dependence between cumulative emissions and global temperature changes, (2) the decomposition of recent trends in emission and (3) mitigation pathways from integrated assessment modelling, and analyses their consistency with the 2 °C climate target.
CO 2 emission update
The CO 2 emission quota compatible with a given temperature limit encompasses both past and future emissions. Since CO 2 is emitted each year, the remaining quota decreases with time. Here, we first update the remaining emissions quota by providing updated estimates of cumulative emissions through to 2013 before projecting emissions up to 2019. CO 2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and cement production (E FF ) were estimated at 36.1 (34.3-37.9) GtCO 2 in 2013, 2.3% above emissions in 2012 (Fig. 1a, Methods) . Cumulative E FF from 1870 to 2013 were 1,430 ± 70 GtCO 2 , with historical estimates based on energy consumption statistics 31 and including uncertainties in the energy statistics and conversion rates 31, 32 . Recent attempts have been made to verify emissions from atmospheric measurements and modelling 33 , but their interpretation is hindered by the influence of the carbon sinks 34, 35 . On short timescales, the changes in CO 2 E FF are generally driven by increases in economic activity as measured by the gross domestic product (GDP) and the decrease (improvement) in the carbon intensity of the world economy (I FF ) 36, 37 . A decomposition of emissions into a simplified Kaya identity, E FF = GDP × I FF , offers an effective way to understand short-term emissions trends [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] . This simple relationship will be used throughout this article to understand drivers of recent emission changes and provide short-term emission projections.
In (Fig. 1a) . Using the simplified Kaya identity, the decrease in the growth rate of global CO 2 emissions in recent years has been due, in roughly equal parts, to a slight decrease in GDP growth rate and a slightly stronger decrease in I FF (Supplementary Fig. 2 ). The positive decadal growth rate in global emissions is due to strong growth in economic activity and The equivalent emission-years correspond to the emission quota divided by the last available year of emissions, given for 2 °C and 3 °C only. Cumulative emissions and quotas are shown with a 5-95% range, rounded to the nearest 100.
emissions. We estimate land-use change emissions in 2013 using the most recent global carbon budget 49 based on a combination of a bookkeeping estimate 48 and fire emissions in deforested areas 50 (Methods). We estimate emissions of 3.2 ± 1. emissions since 2007 as a result of a return to a stronger economic growth rate (2.2%), and an unusual increase in I FF (0.7%) (Fig. 2c and Supplementary Fig. 2c ), largely because coal has regained some market share from natural gas in the electric power sector 45 . The EU28's 1.8% decrease in emissions in 2013 continued the persistent downward trend despite increased coal consumption in some EU countries (for example, Poland, Germany and Finland). The decrease in emissions in EU28 was driven by a relatively low GDP growth rate (0.5%) and a decrease in I FF (2.2%) ( Fig. 2d and Supplementary  Fig. 2d ), with the largest emission decreases occurring in Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom, and the largest increase in Germany.
Developing countries and emerging economies (taken as nonAnnex B) had a 3.4% increase in emissions in 2013, continuing previous trends 42 . China's 4.2% growth in emissions in 2013 continued its decelerating growth (Fig. 2b) (Supplementary Fig. 2b ). It is too early to say whether the recent decline in I FF in 2013 can be attributed to dedicated mitigation policies. Despite this strong decrease in I FF , the high absolute I FF in China, combined with strong GDP growth, is the main reason for the weakening I FF at the global level ( Supplementary Fig. 3 ). India's 5.1% growth in emissions in 2013 compares to growth rates of 5.7% yr -1 from 2000-2009 and 6.4% yr -1 from 2010-2013 (Fig. 2e) . The recent Indian emissions growth was driven by robust economic growth and by an increase in I FF (Supplementary Fig. 2e ). India is the only major economy with a sustained increase in I FF (carbonization of its economy) from 2010-2013 ( Fig. 2 and Supplementary Fig. 2 ).
The robust relationship between GDP and E FF that emerged in the past (Figs 1 and 2 ) is used here to estimate future emissions on short timescales using projected growth rates of GDP by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 46 combined with an assumption of persistent trends in I FF 40, 42 . This method provides first-order estimates of CO 2 emissions in the absence of additional emission mitigation policies. , we estimate 2014 E FF to be 37.0 (35.2-38.9) GtCO 2 , or 2.5% (1.3%-3.5%) above 2013 and 65% above 1990 emissions (Fig. 1) . The range takes into account the uncertainty in IMF GDP projections and variability in I FF caused by a range of socio-economic factors 42 (Supplementary Information). Similar estimates are made at the national level (Table 2 and Fig. 2 ). While strong inertial factors maintain global emissions growth within a relatively small range, at the regional level significant and unexpected events can lead to strong deviations, and regional uncertainty is much more difficult to quantify. We therefore do not provide uncertainty estimates at the regional level, but acknowledge that they are potentially large.
Emissions from land-use changes have been stable or decreasing in the past decade 48 and currently contribute about 8% of total CO 2 Based on combined data and our 2014 estimate, cumulative CO 2 emissions from all sources during 1870-2014 will reach 2,000 ± 200 GtCO 2 . About 25% of this 145-year period was emitted over the last 15 years alone (2000-2014). The cumulative emissions from 1870 were 75% from fossil fuels and cement production and 25% from land-use change.
Remaining CO 2 quota
Taking into account CO 2 emissions prior to 2014, the remaining emissions quota (from 2015 onwards) associated with a 66% probability of keeping warming below 2 °C is estimated to be 1,200 (900-1,600) GtCO 2 . This 2 °C quota will be exhausted in about 30 (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) 'equivalent emission-years' at the 2014 emission level (40.3 GtCO 2 yr -1 ). Owing to inter-annual and decadal variability [51] [52] [53] , the actual year when 2 °C will be reached is uncertain. The remaining quota associated with a 50% probability of committing to 2 °C of warming is estimated to be 1,500 (1,100-1,900) GtCO 2 (Table 1) , corresponding to 37 (27-47) equivalent emission-years at the 2014 emission level. The remaining quota is significantly higher for 3 °C (Table 1 ), but it is finite for even the highest warming levels.
The equivalent emission-years indicator is a simple and transparent metric for communicating the size of the remaining carbon budget compatible with a warming level given our current emission levels.
Many of the low stabilization scenarios in the literature, such as the representative concentration pathway (RCP) 2.6, rely on emissions below zero (so-called negative emissions) in the second half of the century, in effect compensating for emissions today 24, 54 . Most models achieve negative emissions through intensive use of bioenergy coupled with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) [55] [56] [57] , and the availability of BECCS is important in cost-effective 2 °C mitigation pathways 55, 56 . Negative emissions at the global level will lead to a peak and decline in cumulative emissions 58 . The validity of the TCRE in a negative emissions scenario remains to be fully assessed; analyses with comprehensive Earth system models are required to fully explore the carbon cycle and climate response to negative emission scenarios, though research has started in this area 10, [59] [60] [61] . There is also a need to fully explore the risks of relying on BECCS (currently unavailable at commercial scale) for 2 °C mitigation pathways. Studies show that explicitly limiting or eliminating the availability of carbon capture and storage (CCS) and carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies in mitigation scenarios does not necessarily rule out the feasibility of a 2 °C limit, but does increase the need for deep emission reductions in the short term 55, 56, 62 . The few studies that explored 2 °C pathways without CCS and CDR from emission levels that are in line with the current emission reduction by 2020 pledges of countries found these to be either unfeasible [63] [64] [65] [66] [67] [68] or extremely costly 64, [67] [68] [69] . 40 . Policies or trends that further reduce I FF , or would lower GDP growth rates, would directly reduce these emission estimates. The recent US policy announcements on power plant emissions or China's energy efficiency and renewable targets would at least continue existing I FF trends, but it is unclear at present if they would lead to stronger decreases in I FF . Emission projections accounting for current policies such as those from the International Energy Agency 70 and baseline projections available in the literature and summarized in the IPCC WGIII database often show a lower growth rate than our GDP-based projection (Figs 3 and 4) , either based on an assumption of slower GDP growth or a stronger decrease in I FF .
Emission projections and climate targets
We additionally extend these projections to the regional level using the same methods. Figure 2 shows the regional trends in GDP, I FF and hence E FF . In general, anticipated GDP growth is offset by decreases in I FF (Supplementary Fig. 2 ). We find that emissions from China would continue to grow at 3.9% yr -1 over 2014-2019, USA emissions at 0.2% yr -1 similar to recent estimates by the US Energy Information Administration 71 , EU28 emissions reduce by -0.9% yr -1 and Indian emissions grow at 5.9% yr -1 (Table 2 , Fig. 2 and Supplementary Fig. 2 ). Based on these projections, the cumulative fossil fuel and cement emissions over 2015-2019 are estimated to be 200 (190-210) GtCO 2 . Assuming stable land-use-change emissions, we expect these to contribute an additional 16 (8-24) GtCO 2 during that period. This brings total cumulative emissions for 2015-2019 to 220 (200-240) GtCO 2 , and the remaining emission quota from 2020, associated with a 66% probability of limiting warming below 2 °C, down to 1,000 (700-1,400) GtCO 2 , or 22 (15-30) equivalent emission-years from 2020. The remaining quotas and equivalent emission-years from 2020 onwards for 3 °C and 4 °C limits are given in Table 1 .
Our GDP-based emission estimates are higher than all costeffective 2 °C scenarios in the literature (Fig. 3) for 2010-2019 . In fact, current IPCC WGIII scenarios that attempt to keep warming below 2 °C, show lower emissions for 2014 than our projection (Fig. 3b) , mostly because these scenarios were published before 2014 and assumed a 'cost-optimal' mitigation pathway starting in 2010. In 2019, the discrepancy between our GDP-based estimates and the cost-effective mitigation pathways is even more exacerbated, with the GDP-based emissions projections being about 40% higher than the levels suggested by cost-effective 2 °C scenarios (Fig. 3c) . This indicates that without a rapid and clear break in the historical trends of I FF or GDP the opportunity to follow cost-effective 2 °C mitigation pathways in the near-term, as reported by the IPCC WGIII, has passed, and the challenges to mitigation would need to be framed around the more costly scenarios that assume a delay in comprehensive mitigation 64, [67] [68] [69] .
The IPCC WGIII mitigation scenarios consistent with the 2 °C limit show a reduction or even reversal in the CO 2 emissions growth due to radical decreases of I FF (Fig. 4c) . While GDP growth rates are similar to our estimate (Fig. 4b) , they show carbon intensity decreasing by 2 to 5% per year, as opposed to our estimate of 0.8% per year based on recent trends 64, [66] [67] [68] (Fig. 4c) . The rapidly changing structure of the world economy with a growing contribution from emerging economies and developing countries with a high carbon-intensity drives increases in I FF at the global level ( Supplementary Fig. 3 ) and further exacerbates the mitigation challenge. For emerging economies and developing countries, the recent carbon intensity decreases, which we use for our near-term projections, have been significantly smaller than the near-term trends anticipated by most emission scenarios, even baseline scenarios in absence of climate policy (see Supplementary Figs 4-8 for a comparison of regional trends in GDP and I FF with IPCC WGIII emission scenarios).
Climate policy implications
Climate policy discussions have progressed since 2010 and many countries have pledged to limit or reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 [72] [73] [74] . While GDP-based projections of emissions are considerably higher than those of the cost-optimal 2 °C scenarios, recent studies have shown that even from such high emission levels in 2020, options exist to limit warming to below 2 °C 64, [66] [67] [68] [69] . However, following such trajectories has important consequences and entails risks. Five main challenges and trade-offs must be overcome 64, [66] [67] [68] [75] [76] [77] : (1) higher emissions in the near term require stronger emission reductions thereafter -a trade-off that has become trivially understandable since the introduction of the TCRE concept and the quantification of a 2 °C consistent carbon emission quota; (2) an increased lock-in into carbon-intensive and energyintensive infrastructure 66, 67, 78, 79 -the recent trends discussed above provide real-world support for this concern; (3) reduced societal choices for future generations -modest near-term emission reductions increase the dependence on specific mitigation technologies and therewith foreclose choices and options of future generations 55, 64, [66] [67] [68] [69] 79 (dependence on negative emissions technologies is one example); (4) higher overall costs and economic challenges; and (5) higher climate risks, for example through higher near-term rates of change, higher cumulative climate impact damages, or an increased probability of abrupt or irreversible changes 64, 68, 77, 80 . Stabilization of global temperature rise at any level requires global carbon emissions to become eventually virtually zero 81 . The existence of a limited global emissions quota raises many issues of how to share remaining emissions, including how to take into account historical responsibilities and development needs. These issues are discussed in a companion paper 82 . Irrespective of the difficulty of how to share the remaining quota, our review of recent emission trends and the mitigation scenario literature shows that, if keeping warming below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels is to be maintained as an overarching objective, a break in current emission trends is urgently needed in the short term.
Methods
Data. Global and regional CO 2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and cement emissions are based on emissions estimates from the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center 83 (CDIAC), extended to 2013 using anomalies in energy statistics from BP (ref. 84) following the methodology and country definitions used in the Global Carbon Budget 42 . CO 2 emissions from land-use change are estimated using a bookkeeping method 48 from 1850-2010 and then supplemented and extended from 1997-2013 using satellite-based fire emissions in deforestation areas 50 , following the methodology in the most recent Global Carbon Budget 49 . GDP data is from the International Energy Agency 85 up until 2011 and extended to 2019 using the growth rates from two editions of the IMF's World Economic Outlook 46, 47 . The IPCC WGIII scenarios are obtained from the scenario database 24, 86 .
Uncertainty.
We place an uncertainty of ± 5% (1σ) on the fossil fuel and cement emissions 31, 42 consistent with recent detailed analysis of uncertainty 32 and apply the same uncertainty for the cumulative emissions (Supplementary Information). The uncertainty in emissions projections includes the uncertainty in future GDP estimates and different time periods for estimating I FF , and consecutive emissions estimates are assumed to be uncorrelated (Supplementary Information). The allowable cumulative emissions quota is derived with a certain modelled likelihood (% of model runs) that a specified warming level is exceeded (for example, 2 °C above the average over 1850-1900) including non-CO 2 forcing (Supplementary Information). Quotas are shown with a 5%-95% range, rounded to the nearest 100. The range in equivalent emission-years is obtained taking the range in remaining budget, neglecting the relatively small uncertainty due to global annual emissions uncertainty.
Growth rates. Growth rates between two years (for example, 2012-2013) are based on the percentage increase over the first year. To prevent invalid interpretations of annual change we make leap-year adjustments to annual growth rates, such that growth rates go up approximately 0.3% if the first year is a leap year and down 0.3% if the second year is a leap year. Growth rates over more than two consecutive years are computed by taking the first derivative of the linear regression of the logarithm of all variables available in this time period (Supplementary Information).
